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Core stability in hedonic coalition formation
Gerhard J. Woeginger∗
Abstract
In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in
groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households
and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade unions. The underlying
game theoretic framework is known as coalition formation.
This survey discusses the notion of core stability in hedonic coalition formation
(where each player’s happiness only depends on the other members of his coalition but
not on how the remaining players outside his coalition are grouped). We present the
central concepts and algorithmic approaches in the area, provide many examples, and
pose a number of open problems.
Keywords: computational social choice; computational complexity; coalition formation;
hedonic game.
1 Introduction
In economic, social and political situations individuals often carry out activities in groups
(coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households, families
and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade unions. The underlying
game theoretic framework is known as coalition formation. In hedonic coalition formation
each player’s happiness/satisfaction only depends on the other members of his coalition,
but not on how the remaining players outside his coalition are grouped together. The study
of coalition formation in hedonic games goes back to the seminal paper [19] of Dre`ze &
Greenberg.
A central question in coalition formation concerns the stability of a system of coalitions:
if there is a possibility of increasing one’s happiness/satisfaction by moving to another
coalition or by merging or splitting or otherwise restructuring coalitions, players will react
accordingly and the system will become unstable. The social choice literature knows a
wide variety of stability concepts, as for instance the core, the strict core, the Nash stable
set, the individually stable set, and the contractually individually stable set. A research line
initiated by Banerjee, Konishi & So¨nmez [5] and by Bogomolnaia & Jackson [8] concentrates
on sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of such stable solutions. Computational
complexity issues related to hedonic coalition formation have first been investigated by
Ballester [4] who establishes the NP-completeness of detecting core stable, Nash stable, and
individually stable partitions (under appropriately chosen encodings of the input).
∗
gwoegi@win.tue.nl. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, TU Eindhoven, P.O. Box 513,
5600 MB Eindhoven, Netherlands
1
This paper zooms into core stability, a particularly active subarea of hedonic coalition
formation games. We survey the central computational questions of this rich and colorful
area, and we will see that their algorithmic behavior is surprisingly diverse. The underlying
main definitions are introduced in Section 2. Each of the remaining sections discusses one
particular type of hedonic game, summarizes the known results on algorithms and complex-
ity, provides examples, and also poses a number of open problems. The open problems are
marked in the following way: (∗) marks a problem that should be doable; (∗∗) means that
the problem might be difficult; (∗∗∗) marks a hard and outstanding problem.
2 Basic definitions and first observations
Let N be a finite set of players. A coalition is a non-empty subset of N . Every player
i ∈ N ranks all the coalitions containing i via his preference relation i; this order relation
is reflexive (S i S), transitive (S i T and T i U implies S i U) and complete (at least
one of S i T and T i S holds), but it is not necessarily anti-symmetric (so that S i T
and T i S may hold simultaneously). The underlying strict order is denoted ≺i, where
S ≺i T means that S i T but not T i S. If S ≺i T then player i prefers participating
in T to participating in S, and if S i T then player i weakly prefers participating in T to
participating in S.
A partition Π is simply a collection of coalitions which partitions N ; hence every coalition
in Π is non-empty, distinct coalitions are disjoint, and the union of all coalitions equals N .
For a partition Π and a player i, we denote by Π(i) the unique coalition in Π containing
player i. The following definition introduces core stability, the key concept of this paper.
Definition 2.1 A coalition S blocks a partition Π, if every player i ∈ S strictly prefers
Π(i) ≺i S. A partition Π is core stable, if there is no blocking coalition.
Intuitively speaking, the players in a blocking coalition would like to separate and form
their own coalition, which makes the underlying partition unstable. The game is hedonic,
since the satisfaction/dissatisfaction of a player only depends on the other members of his
coalition, but not on the grouping of the remaining players outside his coalition.
A closely related stability notion is strict core stability. A coalition S weakly blocks a
partition Π, if every player i ∈ S weakly prefers Π(i) i S, and if at least one player j ∈ S
strictly prefers Π(j) ≺j S. A partition Π is strictly core stable, if it has no weakly blocking
coalition. Note that a strictly core stable partition is also core stable. While our main focus
in this survey is on core stability, we will from time to time also point out results on strict
core stability.
Example 2.2 Consider a situation with three players a, b, c that have the following prefer-
ences over their coalitions:
Preferences of player a: ab > ac > a > abc
Preferences of player b: bc > ab > b > abc
Preferences of player c: ac > bc > c > abc
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There are only five possible partitions of the players: the partition {abc} is blocked by a,
{ab, c} is blocked by bc, {ac, b} is blocked by ab, {bc, c} is blocked by ac, and {a, b, c} is
blocked by ab. Hence there is no core stable partition, and there also is no strictly core stable
partition.
Problem: Core-Stability (Existence)
Instance: A hedonic game, that consists of a set N of players and their pref-
erence relations i.
Question: Does there exist a core stable partition of N?
Problem: Core-Stability (Verification)
Instance: A hedonic game, that consists of a set N of players and their pref-
erence relations i; a partition Π of N .
Question: Does there exist a blocking coalition S for partition Π?
Figure 1: The algorithmic problems around core stability.
The central algorithmic questions are of course to decide whether a given game possesses
a core stable partition (existence problem) and to check whether a given partition for a given
game actually is core stable (verification problem). Both problems are formally specified
in Figure 1. The precise computational complexity of these two problems depends on the
way the preference relations are specified in the input, and we will see a variety of natural
ways in the following chapters. Throughout we only consider representations of the input for
which the preference relations can be evaluated in polynomial time: given a player i and two
coalitions S and T with i ∈ S and i ∈ T , we can decide in polynomial time whether S i T .
Consequently we are also able to decide in polynomial time whether a given coalition S
blocks a given partition Π of a given hedonic game.
Here is a rewording of the existence problem that clearly shows the quantifiers in the
underlying question:
Does there exist a partition Π of the players, such that every coalition S satisfies
the property that S is not blocking for Π?
Or even shorter: ∃Π ∀S: ¬(S blocks Π). This reworded formulation starts with an existential
quantification, followed by an existential quantification, followed by a property that can be
verified in polynomial time, and hence is a Σp2-formulation; see for instance Theorem 17.8
in Papadimitriou [34].
Observation 2.3 As the preference relations can be evaluated in polynomial time, the exis-
tence version of Core-Stability is contained in the complexity class Σp2 and the verification
version is contained in NP. 
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The verification problem ∃S: (S blocks Π) is the negation of the inner part of the exis-
tence problem ∃Π ∀S: ¬(S blocks Π). This yields the following straightforward connection
between the two problems.
Observation 2.4 If the verification problem of Core-Stability is polynomially solvable,
then the existence version of Core-Stability is contained in the complexity class NP. 
There are no further close connections between existence problem and verification prob-
lem. In particular, hardness of the verification problem does not necessarily imply hardness
of the existence problem: under the enemy-oriented preferences in Section 4 existence is
easy whereas verification is hard. We close this section with the common ranking property
of Farrell & Scotchmer [21] for hedonic games in which all players have the same opinion
about their coalitions. Since such a game has little potential for disagreement, there always
is a core stable partition:
Observation 2.5 (Farrell & Scotchmer [21]) Consider a hedonic game for which there
exists a function f : 2N → R such that S i T (for any player i with i ∈ S and i ∈ T )
always implies f(S) ≤ f(T ). Then this game has a core stable partition.
Proof. Pick a coalition S that maximizes the value of function f . As the players in S prefer
S to all other coalitions, they will never participate in a blocking coalition. Repeat this step
for the remaining players. 
3 Complexity of the most general variants
We already noted earlier that the computational complexity of the Core-Stability exis-
tence and verification problem does heavily depend on the representation of the input.
The trivial encoding of an n-player game presents the preference relation of every player
by explicitly listing and ranking all the 2n−1 coalitions that contain that player. If we ignore
polynomial factors, the resulting encoding length is roughly L ≈ 2n. As the verification
problem can be solved by searching through all 2n ≈ L coalitions, it is polynomially solvable
under the trivial encoding. The existence problem can be solved similarly by searching
through all partitions of the player set. Now recall that an n-element set has roughly cn logn
different partitions (where c is some real constant; see for instance De Bruijn [10]), so that
the resulting time complexity would be roughly proportional to Llog logL. On the one hand
this time complexity is bad, as it is not polynomially bounded in the encoding length L. But
on the other hand this time complexity is quite good, as it has a very mild and innocent
sub-exponential growth rate; this makes it unlikely that the existence problem could be
NP-complete.
Open Problem 3.1 (∗∗) Pinpoint the computational complexity of the Core-Stability
existence problem under the trivial encoding.
A good starting point for this open problem might perhaps be the complexity class
LOGLOGNP introduced by Papadimitriou & Yannakakis in [35]. In any case the trivial
encoding is inefficient, wasteful and unwieldy, and it definitely is not the right way for
encoding preference structures in the real world.
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A central assumption in cooperative game theory is individual rationality, which says
that no player should receive less than what he could get on his own. In our framework a
coalition S is individually rational for player i iff it satisfies {i} i S. If a coalition is not
individually rational, it is blocked by some single-player set and hence can never occur in a
core stable partition. In this spirit Ballester [4] suggests to specify the preference relation
for player i by listing only his individually rational coalitions; we call this the individually
rational encoding of the input.
Theorem 3.2 (Ballester [4]) Under the individually rational encoding, the Core-Stabi-
lity verification problem is polynomially solvable and the Core-Stability existence prob-
lem is NP-complete.
Proof. The verification problem is straightforward, as the input explicitly lists all candidates
for a blocking set. By Observation 2.4 then the existence problem lies in NP, and it remains
to establish its NP-hardness.
The NP-hardness proof is done by a reduction from the NP-complete Exact Cover
by 3-Sets (XC3) problem; see Garey & Johnson [24]. An instance of XC3 consists of a
ground set X and a system T of 3-element subsets of X. The problem is to decide whether
there exists a partition of X that only uses parts from T . We introduce for every element
x ∈ X three corresponding players x, x′ and x′′ in a hedonic game. The preferences of these
players are as follows.
• The top choices of player x are the triples T ∈ T with x ∈ T ; he likes all of them equally
much. Strictly below these sets he (strictly) ranks the three coalitions xx′′ ≻ xx′ ≻ x.
• Player x′ only wants to be in three coalitions which he ranks xx′ ≻ x′x′′ ≻ x′.
• Player x′′ only wants to be in three coalitions which he ranks x′x′′ ≻ xx′′ ≻ x′′.
We claim that the constructed hedonic game has a core stable partition if and only if the
XC3 instance has a feasible partition. (Proof of if): Use the sets in the XC3 partition
together with all sets x′x′′. The resulting partition is core stable, since every player x ∈ X
is in one of his most preferred coalitions. (Proof of only if): If a partition for the hedonic
game puts a player x ∈ X into one of the three coalitions xx′′, xx′, x, it cannot be core stable
as the three players x, x′, x′′ are essentially in the unstable situation of Example 2.2. Hence
every player x must be placed into a group from T , and a core stable partition induces a
partition of X with all parts from T . 
Ballester [4] also extends his NP-completeness result to the case where all preference
relations are strict; as a side result this yields NP-completeness of deciding the existence
of a strictly core stable partition under the individually rational encoding. Next we turn
to so-called additive hedonic games, which form a common generalization of many other
hedonic games that will be discussed lateron in this survey.
Definition 3.3 A hedonic game is additive, if every player i ∈ N has a real-valued prefer-
ence function vi : N → R so that S i T holds if and only if
∑
j∈S vi(j) ≤
∑
j∈T vi(j).
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In other words, in an additive hedonic game every player has a value for every other
player, and the value of a coalition is simply the overall value of its members (from the view
point of player i); hence every player can easily evaluate his profit from participating in a
certain coalition. Additive preference structures allow a particularly natural and succinct
representation, as they can be specified by n2 numbers for n players. Furthermore, addi-
tive preferences satisfy a number of desirable axiomatic properties; see Barbera`, Bossert &
Pattanaik [6].
Example 3.4 Consider five players a0, a1, a2, a3, a4 that are sitting (in this order) around
a round table. Every player ai assigns a value vi(ai+1) = 1 to the player to his right, a value
vi(ai−1) = 2 to the player to his left, and a value −4 to the remaining two players (indices
are taken modulo 5 throughout). We claim that this additive hedonic game does not allow a
core stable partition.
Indeed, any coalition of size three or more contains an unhappy player who rather would
stay alone. If a partition contains two single-player coalitions {ai} and {ai+1}, then it
would be blocked by {ai, ai+1}. In the only remaining case for a potentially core stable
partition, there is one single-player coalition {ai} and two two-player coalitions {ai+1, ai+2}
and {ai+3, ai+4}; this partition is blocked by {ai, ai+1}. Hence there is no core stable partition
(and there also is no strictly core stable partition).
Sung & Dimitrov [40] show that Core-Stability verification in additive hedonic games
is strongly NP-complete; this also follows from Theorem 4.5. It took more time to fully
understand the complexity of the Core-Stability existence problem for the additive case.
On the positive side, Observation 2.4 tells us that the problem is contained in Σp2. On the
negative side, Sung & Dimitrov [41] proved it to be NP-hard, and later Aziz, Brandt & Seedig
[3] extended the NP-hardness argument even to the symmetric case where vi(j) = vj(i)
holds for all players i, j ∈ N . Finally Woeginger [44] settled the problem by showing that is
encapsulates the full difficulty of Σp2.
Theorem 3.5 (Woeginger [44]) In additive hedonic games, the Core-Stability existence
problem is Σp2-complete. 
Next, let us turn to strictly core stable partitions in additive hedonic games. The
arguments of Sung & Dimitrov [40] imply the NP-completeness of the verification question
for this scenario. Sung & Dimitrov [41] prove NP-hardness of the existence question, but it
seems very unlikely to me that this problem could actually be contained in NP.
Open Problem 3.6 (∗) Establish Σp2-completeness of deciding whether a given additive
hedonic game has a strictly core stable partition.
4 Preference structures from graphs
Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx & Sung [18] study hedonic games where each player views every
other player either as a friend or as an enemy: the players form the vertices of a directed
graph G = (N,A), an arc (x, y) from player x to player y means that x considers y a friend,
and the absence of such an arc means that x considers y an enemy. We stress that here
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friendship is not a symmetric relation. For a player x ∈ N , we denote by Fx the set of
his friends and by Ex the set of his enemies. Dimitrov & al [18] introduce two concrete
preference structures that we will dub friend-oriented and enemy-oriented, respectively.
Definition 4.1 Under friend-oriented preferences, player x prefers coalition T to coalition
S (that is, S x T with x ∈ S and x ∈ T )
• if |S ∩ Fx| < |T ∩ Fx|, or
• if |S ∩ Fx| = |T ∩ Fx| and |S ∩ Ex| ≥ |T ∩ Ex|.
Under enemy-oriented preferences, player x prefers coalition T to coalition S
• if |S ∩ Ex| > |T ∩Ex|, or
• if |S ∩ Ex| = |T ∩Ex| and |S ∩ Fx| ≤ |T ∩ Fx|.
Note that friend-oriented and enemy-oriented preferences both form special cases of
additive preferences: in the friend-oriented case, we set vx(y) = |N | if x considers y a friend
and vx(y) = −1 otherwise; in the enemy-oriented case, we set vx(y) = 1 if x considers
y a friend and vx(y) = −|N | otherwise. Although the definitions of these two preference
structures are symmetric to each other, the two resulting classes of hedonic games do behave
very differently from each other. Let us start our discussion with the friend-oriented scenario.
Theorem 4.2 (Dimitrov & al [18]) Under friend-oriented preferences, there always exists
a core stable partition.
Proof. We use the strongly connected components C1, . . . , Ck of the directed graph as
partition. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a blocking coalition S.
Without much loss of generality we assume that S intersects every component Ci (as the
non-intersecting components can be safely ignored). There exists a sink component Cj
without arcs to other components, and we distinguish two cases. If Cj 6⊆ S, then one of the
vertices in S∩Cj has an arc into Cj−S; hence this vertex has fewer friends in S than in Ci,
and S is not blocking. If Cj ⊆ S, then every vertex in Cj has the same number of friends
in Cj and in S, but strictly more enemies in S; hence S is not blocking. 
(A closer look at this proof shows that the strongly connected components actually form
a strictly core stable partition.) It is easy to see that in a core stable partition every coalition
must be strongly connected, but there also exist examples with core stable partitions where
every coalition is a proper subset of a strongly connected component: assume that players
A1 and A2 are mutual friends, that B1 and B2 are mutual friends, that A1 is friendly towards
B1, and that B2 is friendly towards A2. Then the partition {A1, A2} and {B1, B2} is core
stable.
Open Problem 4.3 (∗) Is there a polynomial time algorithm for the Core-Stability
verification problem under friend-oriented preferences?
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We turn to the enemy-oriented scenario, and we start with a crucial observation: if player
x considers player y an enemy, then a core stable partition cannot place x and y together into
the same coalition. Such a coalition would violate individual rationality, as player x would
rather stay alone than be together with y. Consequently under the enemy-oriented scenario
only mutual (symmetric) friendship relations matter, and from now on we will assume that
the underlying friendship graph G actually is undirected. Note furthermore that in a core
stable partition every coalition induces a clique in G.
Theorem 4.4 (Dimitrov & al [18]) Under enemy-oriented preferences, there always exists
a core stable partition.
Proof. The game satisfies the common ranking property in Observation 2.5: set f(S) = |S|
if S induces a clique and f(S) = 0 otherwise. 
Superficially, the results for friend-oriented preferences in Theorem 4.2 and for enemy-
oriented preferences in Theorem 4.4 have a very similar smell. But the two problems differ
a lot, if one actually wants to find such a core stable partition. As the strongly connected
components of a directed graphs can be determined in polynomial time (see for instance
Cormen & al [15]), in the friend-oriented scenario core stable partitions are easy to find. On
the other hand maximum cliques are NP-hard to find (Garey & Johnson [24]), and every
core stable partition in the enemy-oriented scenario must contain such a maximum clique;
hence in the enemy-oriented scenario core stable partitions are hard to find.
Theorem 4.5 (Sung & Dimitrov [40]) Under enemy-oriented preferences, the Core-Sta-
bility verification problem is strongly NP-complete.
Proof. By Observation 2.3 the verification problem lies in NP. NP-hardness is shown by a
reduction from the NP-completeMaximum Clique problem; see Garey & Johnson [24]. An
instance of the clique problem consists of an undirected graph G′ = (V ′, E′) and an integer
bound k. The problem is to decide whether the graph contains a clique on k vertices.
We define a new graph G = (V,E) by adding vertices and edges to G′: for every vertex
v ∈ V ′, we create k − 2 new vertices that together with v form a (k − 1)-clique. Finally we
define the partition Π of V whose parts are exactly the vertex sets of these (k − 1)-cliques.
We claim that in the constructed hedonic game for G there is a blocking set for partition Π
if and only if the graph G′ has a clique of size k. (Proof of if): The clique of size k forms
a blocking set for Π. (Proof of only if): If G′ has no clique of size k, the largest clique in
graph G has size k − 1. Hence Π assigns every player to his most preferred coalition. 
Next let us discuss strictly core stable partitions. The proof of Theorem 4.5 also implies
NP-completeness of the strict verification problem. The strict existence problem seems to
be fairly messy, and I would not be surprised if it turns out to be Σp2-complete; note for
instance that the path Pn on n ≥ 2 vertices and the cycle Cn on n ≥ 4 vertices allow a
strictly core stable partition if and only if n is even.
Open Problem 4.6 (∗) Pinpoint the computational complexity of deciding whether a given
hedonic game with enemy-oriented preferences has a strictly core stable partition.
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Here is another variation. For an undirected graph G and a vertex v ∈ G, we let ωG(v)
denote the size of the largest clique that contains v. A partition of the vertices is called
wonderfully stable, if every vertex v ends up in a coalition of size ωG(v). In the enemy-
oriented scenario, a wonderfully stable partition puts every player into his most preferred
coalition.
Open Problem 4.7 (∗∗) Pinpoint the computational complexity of deciding whether a
given undirected graph has a wonderfully stable partition.
The wonderfully stable partition problem is NP-hard, but perhaps unlikely to be con-
tained in NP. The problem is also unlikely to be Σp2-complete, as it can be solved in poly-
nomial time with a logarithmic number of calls to an NP-oracle: the oracle algorithm first
determines the value of
∑
v∈N ωG(v) by a binary search; every step in this binary search
costs one call to the NP-oracle; then the algorithm asks the NP-oracle whether there exists
a partition into cliques that reaches this value. This places the problem into the complexity
class Θp2 which is believed to be a proper subset of Σ
p
2; see for instance Wagner [43] or
Theorem 17.7 in [34] for more information on this class.
5 Anonymous preference structures
In a hedonic game with anonymous preferences, every player is indifferent about coalitions of
the same size. Hence a player’s preferences can be concisely specified by stating his ranking
of coalition sizes. A natural example for anonymous preferences is a chess club where all
even group sizes should be fine, whereas odd groups sizes would prevent the players from
splitting into chess-playing pairs.
In the verification problem, we search for a blocking coalition S by checking the possible
sizes s = |S| one by one. For a fixed size s, it is easy to decide whether there are s
players who would be happier in a coalition of size s than in their current coalitions. Since
the verification problem is polynomially solvable, Observation 2.4 yields that the existence
problem lies in NP. Ballester [4] fully settles the complexity:
Theorem 5.1 (Ballester [4]) Under anonymous preferences, the Core-Stability ver-
ification problem is polynomially solvable and the Core-Stability existence problem is
NP-complete.
Darmann & al [17] consider a closely related scenario where every player has a primitive
black-and-white view of the world: he (equally) likes some of the coalition sizes, and he
(equally) hates the remaining ones. The question is whether there exists a wonderfully
stable partition of the players, that is a partition so that each player likes the size of his
coalition.
Theorem 5.2 (Darmann & al [17]) Under anonymous black-and-white preferences, it is
NP-complete to decide whether a hedonic game has a wonderfully stable partition.
Proof. We give a reduction from the Exact Cover by 3-Sets (XC3) problem as defined
in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Let T1, . . . , Tm be an enumeration of the triples in T , and
define num(Tk) = 4k. Here are our players:
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• For every triple T ∈ T , create num(T )− 3 players who like the two sizes num(T )− 3
and num(T ) and hate all other sizes.
• For every x ∈ X, create a single player P (x) who only likes the sizes num(T ) for the
triples T with x ∈ T and hates all the other sizes.
It can be seen that the constructed hedonic game has a core stable partition if and only if
the XC3 instance has a feasible partition. 
Open Problem 5.3 (∗∗) Consider the anonymous black-and-white hedonic game where
every player i likes the sizes s in a certain interval ai ≤ s ≤ bi and hates the remaining
sizes. Is there a polynomial time algorithm for finding a wonderfully stable partition?
6 Partition into pairs
Throughout this section we only consider coalitions of size two. Hence the preferences of a
player can be specified by simply listing his ranking of the other players, and the resulting
hedonic games clearly are additive. Since in this case the Core-Stability verification
problem is straightforward (by searching through all pairs), we concentrate on the existence
problem.
There are two basic variants that are known as the stable matching (or stable marriage)
problem and as the stable roommate problem. The stable matching problem has a bipartite
structure: there are n male and n female players, and the only feasible pairs are man-woman
couples. The stable roommate problem has a non-bipartite structure: there are 2n unisex
players, and every possible pair is feasible.
6.1 Stable matchings
The stable matching problem was introduced in the seminal paper by Gale & Shapley [22],
one of the most cited papers in computational social choice. A matching µ pairs the men
with the women; the partner of man M in the matching is denoted µ(M) and the partner
of woman W is denoted µ(W ). A man M and a woman W form a blocking pair (M,W ) for
matching µ, if M prefers W to his woman µ(M) and if simultaneously W prefers M to her
man µ(W ).
Perhaps the most natural approach to stable matching would be the following itera-
tive improvement procedure: Start with an arbitrary matching, and then iteratively find a
blocking pair (M,W ) and improve the situation by replacing the two pairs (M,µ(M)) and
(µ(W ),W ) by the new pairs (M,W ) and (µ(W ), µ(M)). The following example demon-
strates that this idea may fail horribly.
Example 6.1 (Tamura [42]) There are four men A,B,C,D and four women W,X, Y,Z
with the following preference lists:
A: X > Z > W > Y W : A > C > B > D
B: Y > W > X > Z X: B > D > C > A
C: Z > X > Y > W Y : C > A > D > B
D: W > Y > Z > X Z: D > B > A > C
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Assume that the iterative improvement procedure picks AW,BX,CZ,DY as its starting
point. The following lines show the dynamics of the resulting process.
1. AW,BX,CZ,DY A and Z are blocking
2. AZ,BX,CW,DY C and Y are blocking
3. AZ,BX,CY,DW B and W are blocking
4. AZ,BW,CY,DX D and Z are blocking
5. AX,BW,CY,DZ C and X are blocking
6. AY,BW,CX,DZ A and W are blocking
7. AW,BY ,CX,DZ D and Y are blocking
8. AW,BZ,CX,DY B and X are blocking
The last improvement yields the matching AW,BX,CZ,DY , so that we are back at our
starting point. The process is cycling and will never terminate!
Let us take a closer look at the instance in Example 6.1. There are 24 possible matchings,
five of which are actually stable. If we start the iterative improvement procedure from one
of the three matchings AY,BZ,CW,DX or AW,BZ,CY,DX or AY,BX,CW,DZ, then
the process will eventually reach the stable matching AW,BX,CY,DZ and terminate. But
if we start the iterative improvement procedure from any of the remaining 16 matchings,
then the procedure will cycle and does not terminate.
Fortunately, there exist better approaches for the stable matching problem: it can be
shown that there always exists a stable solution, which furthermore can be computed in
polynomial time by the celebrated Gale-Shapley algorithm [22]. As the books by Knuth
[31], Gusfield & Irving [25], and Roth & Sotomayor [37] comprehensively analyze this algo-
rithm and extensively cover the combinatorial facets of the problem, we only formulate a
summarizing theorem.
Theorem 6.2 (Gale & Shapley [22]) If all preferences are strict, a stable matching always
exists and can be found in polynomial time. 
We now would like to spend some lines on several closely related variants. Theorem 6.2
assumes that every player has a strict preference ranking of the other players. Allowing ties
in the preference relations does not change much: a stable matching always exists and can
be found in polynomial time (by breaking ties arbitrarily and then applying Gale-Shapley);
see for instance Irving [27].
Allowing incomplete preference lists (but still forbidding ties) changes the situation a
little bit. Now every player can exclude some other players with whom he does not want
to be matched (formally this can be done by ranking the unwanted coalitions below the
coalition where he stays alone). It turns out that also for this case a stable matching always
exists and can be found in polynomial time by a slight modification of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm. However a stable matching is not necessarily perfect: it will consist of some
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pairs and of some isolated singletons. Interestingly every stable matching has the same set
of men and women paired up and the same set of men and women as singletons; see Gale
& Sotomayor [23].
Simultaneously allowing both incomplete preference lists and ties messes things up a
lot. A stable matching always exists and can be found in polynomial time, but the same
instance can have very different stable matchings with varying numbers of pairs. Deciding
whether there is a perfect stable matching (which pairs up all the players) is NP-complete;
see Manlove, Irving, Iwama, Miyazaki & Morita [32]. In fact this perfect stable matching
variant is NP-complete even if the preference list of every player lists only three acceptable
partners; see Irving, Manlove & O’Malley [30].
Finally Irving & Leather [28] have shown that counting the number of stable matchings
(in the classical version without ties and without incomplete preference lists) is #P-complete
Chebolu, Goldberg & Martin [14] indicate that even approximate counting should be diffi-
cult.
6.2 Stable roommates
The stable roommate problem is the non-bipartite unisex version of the stable matching
problem. The following example demonstrates that there are roommate instances without
stable matching (note the structural similarity between Example 2.2 and Example 6.3).
Example 6.3 Consider a situation with four players A,B,C,D that have the following
preferences: player A prefers B > C > D; player B prefers C > A > D; player C prefers
A > B > D; and player D prefers A > B > C. Note that none of A,B,C wants to play
with the unpopular dummy player D.
The matching {AB,CD} is blocked by BC, and matching {AC,BD} is blocked by AB,
and matching {BC,AD} is blocked by AC. Hence there is no core stable partition.
A milestone paper by Irving [26] characterizes the roommate instances with core stable
matchings.
Theorem 6.4 (Irving [26]) For the stable roommate problem with strict preferences, the
existence of a stable matching can be decided in polynomial time. 
If we allow incomplete preference lists (but still forbid ties), a minor modification of
Irving’s algorithm [26] solves the stable roommate problem in polynomial time. If we allow
ties in the preference relations, the stable roommate problem becomes NP-complete; see
Ronn [36] and Irving & Manlove [29].
Arkin, Bae, Efrat, Okamoto, Mitchell & Polishchuk [2] discuss a metric variant of the
stable roommate problem where every player is a point in a metric space with distance
function | · |. Player P prefers being with player X to being with player Y if and only if
|PX| ≤ |PY |. This special case always has a stable matching, as it satisfies the common
ranking property of Observation 2.5: just set f(XY ) = −|XY | for coalitions XY of size
two [2].
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7 Partition into triples
Generalizations of the classical Gale-Shapley stable matching problem (with men and women
as the two genders) to three genders (men, women, dogs) usually are very messy. Alkan [1]
seems to have been the first to publish a result on this 3-gender variant, by constructing a
concrete example that does not allow a core stable matching. The preferences in Alkan’s
example are additively separable, and there are n = 3 men, women and dogs. Ng &
Hirschberg [33] exhibit an even smaller bad instance with n = 2:
Example 7.1 (Ng & Hirschberg [33]) Consider two men M1,M2, two women W1,W2 and
two dogs D1,D2 that have the following preferences over the triples:
M1: M1W1D2 > M1W1D1 > M1W2D2 > M1W2D1
M2: M2W2D2 > M2W1D1 > M2W2D1 > M2W1D2
W1: M2W1D1 > M1W1D2 > M1W1D1 > M2W1D2
W2: M2W2D1 > M1W2D1 > M2W2D2 > M1W2D2
D1: M1W2D1 > M1W1D1 > M2W1D1 > M2W2D1
D2: M1W1D2 > M2W2D2 > M1W2D2 > M2W1D2
There are only four possible partitions into two disjoint triples:
The partition {M1W1D1, M2W2D2} is blocked by M1W1D2.
The partition {M1W1D2, M2W2D1} is blocked by M2W1D1.
The partition {M1W2D1, M2W1D2} is blocked by M1W1D2.
The partition {M1W2D2, M2W1D1} is blocked by M2W2D2.
Hence there exists no core stable matching.
Ng & Hirschberg [33] also establish the NP-completeness of deciding the existence of a
core stable matching; this result has also been derived by Subramanian [39] (independently
and by a very different approach).
Donald Knuth [31] proposes the 3-gender stable matching variant with so-called cyclic
preferences: every man M has a strict ordering of the women in the instance, every woman
W has a strict ordering of the dogs, and every dog D has a strict ordering of the men. A
triple MWD is blocking for a given current partition into triples, if man M prefers W to
his currently assigned woman, if woman W prefers D to her currently assigned dog, and if
dog D prefers M to its currently assigned man. Boros, Gurvich, Jaslar & Krasner [9] prove
by case distinctions that every cyclic instance with n = 3 has a core stable matching, and
Eriksson, Sjo¨strand & Strimling [20] extend this positive result to n = 4. The approaches in
[9, 20] are quite technical and involve much case analysis, and they do not seem to generalize
to larger values of n.
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Open Problem 7.2 (∗∗∗) Prove that every instance of the 3-gender stable matching prob-
lem with cyclic preferences has a stable solution.
Biro´ & McDermid [7] consider the case of cyclic preferences with unacceptable partners:
every man finds certain women unacceptable, every woman hates certain dogs, and every
dog dislikes certain men. Under this scenario there exist instances without stable solution,
and deciding the existence of a stable solution is NP-complete.
Danilov [16] discusses a related (but much easier) special case where every man primarily
cares about women and where every woman primarily cares about men (and where the
preferences of the dogs are arbitrary). This special case always has a stable matching. In
a first step, we find a stable matching for the underlying 2-gender instance that consists of
men and women. The preferences of men and women in this 2-gender instance are their
primary rankings in the 3-gender instance. In the second step, we find a stable matching for
the 2-gender instance with dogs on the one side and on the other side the man-woman pairs
from the first step. The preferences of the dogs on man-woman pairs are copied from the
3-gender instance. The preferences of the man-woman pairs on the dogs are always fixed
according to the man in the pair: the pair MW prefers dog D to dog D′, if and only if in
the 3-gender instance manM prefers tripleMWD to tripleMWD′. Everything else follows
from the Gale-Shapley Theorem 6.2.
In the 3-dimensional roommate problem all players have the same gender and every
triple is a potential coalition. Ng & Hirschberg [33] establish NP-completeness of deciding
the existence of a core stable matching in the 3-dimensional roommate problem. Arkin,
Bae, Efrat, Okamoto, Mitchell & Polishchuk [2] discuss the following geometric variant of
the 3-dimensional roommate problem in the Euclidean plane with distance function | · |:
every player is a point in the Euclidean plane, and player P prefers triple PX1X2 to triple
PY1Y2 if and only if |PX1|+|PX2| < |PY1|+|PY2|. (Note that here the matching problem is
3-dimensional, whereas the underlying geometric space is 2-dimensional. Note furthermore
that the preference structure is additive.) Arkin & al [2] exhibit a highly structured instance
that does not possess a core stable matching; the computational complexity of this special
case however remains open.
Open Problem 7.3 (∗∗) Settle the complexity of the Euclidean 3-dimensional roommate
problem as described in the preceding paragraph.
8 Preference structures from maxima and minima
Cechla´rova´ & Romero-Medina [13] investigate hedonic games where every player ranks his
coalitions according to the most or least attractive member of the coalition. Similarly as
in the additive games in Definition 3.3, every player i ∈ N has a real-valued function
vi : N → R that measures his addiction to each of the other players. For a coalition S, we
define vmaxi (S) = maxj∈S vi(j) as player i’s addiction to the best member of S.
Definition 8.1 Under max-preferences, player i prefers coalition T to coalition S (that is,
S i T with i ∈ S and x ∈ T )
• if vmaxi (S) < v
max
i (T ), or
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• if vmaxi (S) = v
max
i (T ) and |S| ≥ |T |.
An important special case of this scenario are max-preferences without ties; this means
that for distinct players a and b the values vi(a) and vi(b) assigned to them by player i are
always distinct.
Theorem 8.2 (Cechla´rova´ & Hajdukova´ [11]) Under max-preferences, the Core-Stabi-
lity verification problem is polynomially solvable.
Proof. How would we verify the core stablitiy of a given partition Π? The main idea is to
check step by step for k = 1, 2, . . . , |N | whether there exists a blocking coalition S of size
at most k. For checking a concrete value k, we construct an auxiliary directed graph Gk on
the vertex set N ; an arc i → j means that player i strictly prefers every coalition S with
j ∈ S and |S| ≤ k to his current coalition Π(i). Formally the graph Gk contains the arc
i→ j if vmaxi (Π(i)) < vi(j) holds, or if v
max
i (Π(i)) = vi(j) and |S| > k.
If graph Gk contains a directed cycle of length at most k, the corresponding vertices
form a blocking coalition of size at most k. Vice versa, a blocking coalition of size at most k
induces a subgraph in Gk with a cycle of length at most k. The shortest cycle in a directed
graph can be found in polynomial time; see for instance Cormen & al [15]. 
Theorem 8.3 (Cechla´rova´ & Hajdukova´ [11]) Under max-preferences without ties, there
always exists a core stable partition.
Proof. Make every player i point at the player whom he likes most. Then the underlying
directed graph contains a cycle. Pick the players along such a cycle as coalition S, and
repeat this procedure for the remaining graph. 
The algorithm in the proof of Theorem 8.3 is essentially the famous top-trading-cycle
algorithm of David Gale for the house swapping game (see for instance [38]). On the
negative side Cechla´rova´ & Hajdukova´ [11] prove that under max-preferences with ties the
Core-Stability existence problem is NP-complete.
In a closely related line of research Cechla´rova´ & Hajdukova´ [12] investigate min-
preferences where every player ranks his coalitions according to the least attractive member
in the coalition. Under this scenario unstable partitions always have small blocking sets
of size at most 2, so that the Core-Stability verification problem is straightforward to
solve. Furthermore stable partitions always consist of small coalitions of size at most 3. For
min-preferences without ties, Cechla´rova´ & Hajdukova´ [12] design a modification of Irving’s
roommate algorithm (Theorem 6.4) that solves the Core-Stability existence problem in
polynomial time. They also show that for min-preferences with ties the existence problem
is NP-complete.
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